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D.H. Mellor, Mind, Meaning, and Reality. Oxford: Oxford University 
Press, 2012, pp. xiv+231. 
 
Mind, Meaning, and Reality is the second volume of Hugh Mellor's collected papers, 
following Matters of Metaphysics (1991). All but one of the essays have been 
published elsewhere; the exception is 'Success Semantics', a substantial piece of work 
in the broadly Ramseyan tradition of philosophy of mind and language. (Several of 
the other essays also defend and develop Ramsey's ideas.) 
 
Mellor's vigorous and distinctive tone echoes throughout the volume. In the 
introduction, self-described as 'polemical', he defends a moderate naturalism about 
metaphysics: we should neither 'ignore science' nor 'surrender to it'. He also 
complains about a number of 'peculiarly philosophical bad habits': relying too heavily 
on conceptual analysis, insisting that philosophical arguments are only valuable if 
conclusive, wasting time discussing 'theories no-one believes', and substituting meta-
philosophy for philosophy proper. Mellor wants to do 'just enough meta-philosophy 
to deter readers from doing any more'.  
 
Although the essays that follow are indeed largely free of meta-philosophy, they are 
generally no less polemical than the introduction. Mellor writes with rhetorical flair 
and intense conviction, eschewing the more moderate and balanced (some would say 
dry and boring) style of much contemporary metaphysics. Although this makes the 
essays a pleasure to read, at times the reader is left struggling to pin down arguments 
that go by in a flash of elegant prose. 
 
Mellor is an unusually systematic philosopher, and the topics of these essays are 
wide-ranging. Mellor argues that experience is a natural phenomenon; that decision 
theory should be interpreted as descriptive rather than as normative; that 
conditionals express inferential dispositions; that learning by testimony is a special 
case of learning from observation; that the contents of sentences are derivative from 
the contents of beliefs; that dispositions can be analysed in terms of conditionals; 
that only a restricted range of 'atomic' or 'molecular' truths have non-propositional 
truthmakers; that fine-tuning provides no independent evidence for a multiverse 
thesis; that social groups are related to their members as wholes to parts; that there 
are many different part-whole relations; that wholes cannot be reduced to their parts; 
that the B-theory is right about time and the A-theory is right about tense; that 
Kant's transcendental idealism about time makes sense as a thesis about tense; that 
time travel is impossible; and that causation is what gives direction to time. Any 
scholar or student of metaphysics or of mind will find plenty of interest in this 
goldmine of ideas. 
 
 
Alastair Wilson 
University of Birmingham & Monash University 
a.j.wilson@bham.ac.uk 
